Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements

Frédéric Le Manach, Mialy Andriamahefazafy, Sarah Harper, Alasdair Harris, Gilles Hosch, Glenn Marie Lange, Dirk Zeller, Ussif Rashid Sumaila

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The reform of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is focusing attention on EU distant water fishing activities, including the agreements signed with developing coastal states. Here, the EU's fishing agreement with Madagascar, among the poorest countries to hold such an agreement, is examined. Incomes received by Madagascar since the first agreement with the EU in 1986 are documented, in both nominal and real terms, and discussed in the context of other conditions tied to the agreement, in particular support provided by the EU to improve Madagascar's fisheries management capacity. Results indicate that since 1986, EU quotas increased by 30% while the fees paid by the EU decreased by 20%. Yet, Madagascar's treasury income from these agreements decreased by 90%. This shows that the EU agreements with Madagascar are in direct contradiction to the goals set forth by the CFP, which states that benefits of agreements should be directed towards developing countries, and not towards private EU entities. This raises profound ethical questions that the CFP reform must address. A new framework is proposed, prioritizing fisheries sustainability and equitable benefit sharing, in which reasonable quotas are set, fees are indexed to the landed value of catches, and all costs of agreements are borne directly by the benefiting industries. EU development assistance should be decoupled from these agreements, and should focus on enhancing the host countries' monitoring and enforcement capacities. This new framework would increase the benefits to Madagascar while reducing costs to EU taxpayers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-266
Number of pages10
JournalMarine Policy
Volume38
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2013
Externally publishedYes

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Common Fisheries Policy
Madagascar
fishing
EU
fisheries
fishery
income
policy reform
fishery management
cost
European Union
developing world
sustainability
fee
industry
monitoring
fisheries management
Fishing
developing countries
coastal state

Cite this

Le Manach, F., Andriamahefazafy, M., Harper, S., Harris, A., Hosch, G., Lange, G. M., ... Sumaila, U. R. (2013). Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. Marine Policy, 38, 257-266. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.001
Le Manach, Frédéric ; Andriamahefazafy, Mialy ; Harper, Sarah ; Harris, Alasdair ; Hosch, Gilles ; Lange, Glenn Marie ; Zeller, Dirk ; Sumaila, Ussif Rashid. / Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. In: Marine Policy. 2013 ; Vol. 38. pp. 257-266.
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Le Manach, F, Andriamahefazafy, M, Harper, S, Harris, A, Hosch, G, Lange, GM, Zeller, D & Sumaila, UR 2013, 'Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements' Marine Policy, vol. 38, pp. 257-266. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.001

Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. / Le Manach, Frédéric; Andriamahefazafy, Mialy; Harper, Sarah; Harris, Alasdair; Hosch, Gilles; Lange, Glenn Marie; Zeller, Dirk; Sumaila, Ussif Rashid.

In: Marine Policy, Vol. 38, 01.03.2013, p. 257-266.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Le Manach F, Andriamahefazafy M, Harper S, Harris A, Hosch G, Lange GM et al. Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. Marine Policy. 2013 Mar 1;38:257-266. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.001