Vietnam's Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries: How do they perform against Ostrom's institutional design principles?

By employing Ostrom's set of eight design principles (DPs) as an analytical framework, this study evaluates the robustness of the institutions introduced by Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) and investigates how the DPs are interrelated. Data were collected from unstructured and semi-structured interviews with government officials and fishers in fishing communities in Vietnam. Although TURF institutions were found to be in better conformity with the DPs (and therefore more robust) than non-TURF ones, none of the TURFs satisfy all the DPs. Principles relating to collective choice arrangements, monitoring, and nested enterprise structures appear to be the missing elements in the current TURF design, despite the influence they have on the likelihood of adherence to other DPs. Results suggest management policies should better empower fishers, promote fisher participation in monitoring activities and establish horizontal linkages between fishing communities. Lessons learnt from this study will be useful for developing more robust TURF institutions and more sustainable fisheries.