This chapter considers how motivated offenders, the vulnerability of the targets and the (in)adequacy of guardianship contributes to ongoing offending. It explores the concept of super controllers and their role in providing large-scale, long-term control of illegal fishing and addresses only the illegal aspect of the collective Illegal unregulated and unreported fishing definition. Consumers, and indeed other members of the public, can place political pressure on governments to increase regulatory control over the fishing industry to make sustainability policies effective and to ensure marine and fish conservation is a paramount consideration. Illegal fishing is enabled by a number of factors, in particular, corruption and lax regulatory enforcement at several points along the supply chain. The chapter also explores both fish species and States’ maritime areas as potential targets for illegal fishing. Using Routine Activity Theory to better understand illegal fishing exposes what motivates offenders, who the suitable targets are and discusses the capability of guardians.
|Title of host publication||Criminal Networks and Law Enforcement|
|Subtitle of host publication||Global Perspectives On Illegal Enterprise|
|Editors||Saskia Hufnagel, Anton Moiseienko|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Number of pages||17|
|Publication status||Published - 2019|
|Name||Transnational Criminal Justice Series|
Lindley, J., & Techera, E. (2019). Using routine activity theory to explain illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in the Indo-Pacific. In S. Hufnagel, & A. Moiseienko (Eds.), Criminal Networks and Law Enforcement: Global Perspectives On Illegal Enterprise (pp. 120-136). (Transnational Criminal Justice Series). Routledge.