Abstract
Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 365-386 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science |
| Volume | 193 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Feb 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |