In takeover bids for unlisted firms, the typically more closely-knit target shareholders have the bargaining power and incentives to force the bidder's managers to disclose their private information about the value of their firm's shares. The acceptance of share-based offers by private-target shareholders thus conveys favourable information about the net present value of the takeover, unlike the case in share-based bids for listed targets. We document that successful bids for private targets are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns to bidders over the announcement period, a result that diverges from findings based on bids for public targets. Contrary to Chang (1998), share-based bids for Australian private targets are not associated with higher abnormal returns to bidders. Most bids by listed companies for private companies are cash-based and generate a positive return. Our results are consistent with the explanation that lower competition for private targets allows acquirers to capture more of the economic rent from takeovers by offering cash bids.
|Journal||Australian Journal of Management|
|Publication status||Published - 2004|