The Concept of the Copyright Work under EU Law: More Than a Matter of Taste

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked, inter alia, to make a preliminary ruling on whether EU copyright law precludes the taste of food from being protected as a copyright work. This generated expectations that the ECJ and the Advocate General would clarify the scope and meaning of the copyright “work” under EU law. Instead, both the Court and the AG essentially concluded that taste could not be a copyright work because it could not be identified with sufficient objective precision. The article supplements the Court’s reasoning by expanding significantly on why taste must, and yet cannot, be capable of objective identification, and explaining other essential attributes of the copyright work which exclude taste from copyright. The article then interrogates what clues the ECJ has provided on the scope of the copyright work under EU law, and whether it could, and should, have done more to explain the work’s concept and boundaries. The article concludes that while Levola leaves us no closer to a harmonised definition of the copyright work in EU law, it was too ambitious to expect the ECJ to achieve this, particularly given the difficulty of theorising and conceiving of the work in the abstract, and independent to copyright’s shaping filters.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Law Review
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020

Fingerprint

European Law
food
court of justice
supplement
EU
Law

Cite this

@article{9f6b156dd5174e37a9ca0faca0745bc7,
title = "The Concept of the Copyright Work under EU Law: More Than a Matter of Taste",
abstract = "In Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked, inter alia, to make a preliminary ruling on whether EU copyright law precludes the taste of food from being protected as a copyright work. This generated expectations that the ECJ and the Advocate General would clarify the scope and meaning of the copyright “work” under EU law. Instead, both the Court and the AG essentially concluded that taste could not be a copyright work because it could not be identified with sufficient objective precision. The article supplements the Court’s reasoning by expanding significantly on why taste must, and yet cannot, be capable of objective identification, and explaining other essential attributes of the copyright work which exclude taste from copyright. The article then interrogates what clues the ECJ has provided on the scope of the copyright work under EU law, and whether it could, and should, have done more to explain the work’s concept and boundaries. The article concludes that while Levola leaves us no closer to a harmonised definition of the copyright work in EU law, it was too ambitious to expect the ECJ to achieve this, particularly given the difficulty of theorising and conceiving of the work in the abstract, and independent to copyright’s shaping filters.",
author = "Jani McCutcheon",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
journal = "European Law Review",
issn = "0307-5400",
publisher = "Sweet and Maxwell Ltd.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Concept of the Copyright Work under EU Law: More Than a Matter of Taste

AU - McCutcheon, Jani

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - In Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked, inter alia, to make a preliminary ruling on whether EU copyright law precludes the taste of food from being protected as a copyright work. This generated expectations that the ECJ and the Advocate General would clarify the scope and meaning of the copyright “work” under EU law. Instead, both the Court and the AG essentially concluded that taste could not be a copyright work because it could not be identified with sufficient objective precision. The article supplements the Court’s reasoning by expanding significantly on why taste must, and yet cannot, be capable of objective identification, and explaining other essential attributes of the copyright work which exclude taste from copyright. The article then interrogates what clues the ECJ has provided on the scope of the copyright work under EU law, and whether it could, and should, have done more to explain the work’s concept and boundaries. The article concludes that while Levola leaves us no closer to a harmonised definition of the copyright work in EU law, it was too ambitious to expect the ECJ to achieve this, particularly given the difficulty of theorising and conceiving of the work in the abstract, and independent to copyright’s shaping filters.

AB - In Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked, inter alia, to make a preliminary ruling on whether EU copyright law precludes the taste of food from being protected as a copyright work. This generated expectations that the ECJ and the Advocate General would clarify the scope and meaning of the copyright “work” under EU law. Instead, both the Court and the AG essentially concluded that taste could not be a copyright work because it could not be identified with sufficient objective precision. The article supplements the Court’s reasoning by expanding significantly on why taste must, and yet cannot, be capable of objective identification, and explaining other essential attributes of the copyright work which exclude taste from copyright. The article then interrogates what clues the ECJ has provided on the scope of the copyright work under EU law, and whether it could, and should, have done more to explain the work’s concept and boundaries. The article concludes that while Levola leaves us no closer to a harmonised definition of the copyright work in EU law, it was too ambitious to expect the ECJ to achieve this, particularly given the difficulty of theorising and conceiving of the work in the abstract, and independent to copyright’s shaping filters.

M3 - Article

JO - European Law Review

JF - European Law Review

SN - 0307-5400

ER -