Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World

Sam Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti-realism must be adopted. We go on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 26 Sep 2019

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