Offshore Petroleum Regulation: Theory and Disaster as Drivers for Institutional Change

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The overhaul of U.S. offshore regulatory arrangements that
followed the Macondo/Deepwater Horizon disaster is only the
latest in a series of regulatory reconstructions undertaken over
the years by major offshore petroleum producing countries. In
this article, we attempt to relate the continuing process of design
and redesign of offshore regulatory institutions that has been
going on since the 1960s in the United Kingdom, Norway, and
Australia to the general precepts of “good regulation” that have
been developed, notably within “western” governments and in
bodies like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the World Bank, since the 1980s. How
influential have these precepts been in recent processes of
reform? Do they suggest that the United Kingdom, Norway, and
Australia all spent decades practicing “bad” offshore regulation?
Have there been other influences or factors (not least the
occurrence of disasters like the antecedents of Macondo) shaping
the evolution of offshore regulation? And does this evolution
suggest any limits to the applicability of current doctrines about
“good regulation” to the particular circumstances of offshore oil
exploration and production?
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-409
JournalHouston Journal of International Law
Volume39
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017

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regulation theory
institutional change
disaster
driver
regulation
Norway
economic cooperation
World Bank
doctrine
reconstruction

Cite this

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title = "Offshore Petroleum Regulation: Theory and Disaster as Drivers for Institutional Change",
abstract = "The overhaul of U.S. offshore regulatory arrangements thatfollowed the Macondo/Deepwater Horizon disaster is only thelatest in a series of regulatory reconstructions undertaken overthe years by major offshore petroleum producing countries. Inthis article, we attempt to relate the continuing process of designand redesign of offshore regulatory institutions that has beengoing on since the 1960s in the United Kingdom, Norway, andAustralia to the general precepts of “good regulation” that havebeen developed, notably within “western” governments and inbodies like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and the World Bank, since the 1980s. Howinfluential have these precepts been in recent processes ofreform? Do they suggest that the United Kingdom, Norway, andAustralia all spent decades practicing “bad” offshore regulation?Have there been other influences or factors (not least theoccurrence of disasters like the antecedents of Macondo) shapingthe evolution of offshore regulation? And does this evolutionsuggest any limits to the applicability of current doctrines about“good regulation” to the particular circumstances of offshore oilexploration and production?",
author = "Terence Daintith and John Chandler",
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AU - Daintith, Terence

AU - Chandler, John

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AB - The overhaul of U.S. offshore regulatory arrangements thatfollowed the Macondo/Deepwater Horizon disaster is only thelatest in a series of regulatory reconstructions undertaken overthe years by major offshore petroleum producing countries. Inthis article, we attempt to relate the continuing process of designand redesign of offshore regulatory institutions that has beengoing on since the 1960s in the United Kingdom, Norway, andAustralia to the general precepts of “good regulation” that havebeen developed, notably within “western” governments and inbodies like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and the World Bank, since the 1980s. Howinfluential have these precepts been in recent processes ofreform? Do they suggest that the United Kingdom, Norway, andAustralia all spent decades practicing “bad” offshore regulation?Have there been other influences or factors (not least theoccurrence of disasters like the antecedents of Macondo) shapingthe evolution of offshore regulation? And does this evolutionsuggest any limits to the applicability of current doctrines about“good regulation” to the particular circumstances of offshore oilexploration and production?

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