Much ado about aboutness

Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller, James Norton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available - anti-aboutness truthmaking - that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist's position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that if strong non-maximalism can be defended, then so can anti-aboutness truthmaking on the very same basis; one can enjoy the benefits of strong non-maximalism without giving up on the idea that truth is always grounded in being.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-29
Number of pages29
JournalINQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 18 Mar 2019

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