Interregional transfers: A political-economy CGE approach

Nicolaas Groenewold, A.J. Hagger, J.F. Madden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We model the effects of changes in a federal government's inter-regional transfers within the context of a CGE model of a federal system in which regional governments act to maximise the welfare of the residents of their region subject to the effects of their decision on regional economic outcomes. Regional governments are modelled as players in a non-cooperative game. Simulations are conducted with six versions of a small two-region model, each calibrated for a particular Australian state and the rest of the nation. We show that a change in the level of transfers has little influence on per-capita private consumption, government consumption and welfare, and that its main effect is to induce migration from the donor region to the recipient region.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)535-554
JournalPapers in Regional Science
Volume82
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

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political economy
welfare
federal system
Federal Government
recipient
migration
resident
simulation
economics
effect
consumption

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Groenewold, Nicolaas ; Hagger, A.J. ; Madden, J.F. / Interregional transfers: A political-economy CGE approach. In: Papers in Regional Science. 2003 ; Vol. 82, No. 4. pp. 535-554.
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Interregional transfers: A political-economy CGE approach. / Groenewold, Nicolaas; Hagger, A.J.; Madden, J.F.

In: Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2003, p. 535-554.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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