Intentionality and phenomenology

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Abstract

This paper examines two recent attempts to articulate a particular relationship between intentionality and phenomenology. Terry Horgan and John Tienson (2002) have argued for what they call the inseparability thesis: that the intentional and the phenomenal are, in a certain sense, inseparable. Brian Loar (2002, 2003), following on from earlier work, has argued for a kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that is pervasive and more fundamental than ordinary wide content. Problems with both views can be seen once we consider a number of dimensions to intentionality, and reflect more generally on the notion of phenomenal intentionality itself.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)413-431
Number of pages19
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume84
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes

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