Incentivizing and tendering conservation contracts: The trade-off between participation and effort provision

Steven Schilizzi, Uwe Latacz-Lohmann

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    14 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    © 2016 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.
    This paper uses lab experiments to investigate landholder responses to, and the resulting outcome performance of, programs that incentivize and tender conservation contracts. Assuming environmental outcome monitoring is costless, we find that increasing the share of payment linked to uncertain environmental outcomes raises the level of individual stewardship effort but reduces participation, thereby creating a trade-off. This leads to a second trade-off: environmental outcome is maximized at some intermediate level of contract incentivization, but cost-effectiveness at 100%. Tendering such contracts can yield additional benefits in terms of both environmental outcome and cost-effectiveness. However, these benefits decline rapidly with rising incentivization.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)273-291
    JournalLand Economics
    Volume92
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2016

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