In defence of embodied cognition: A reply to Fred Adams

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Fred Adams (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4): 619-628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition (EC) which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain's perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: (1) EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; (2) EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; (3) relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and (4) EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond to Adams that: (1) EC is not committed to an implausible criterion of meaningfulness, though it may be committed to holding that comprehension admits of degrees; (2) EC does have its claimed advantages over rival views; (3) the data do make a strong case for constitutive involvement and (4) a broad and comprehensive EC approach probably can account for the comprehension of abstract concepts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-414
Number of pages12
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume11
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2012
Externally publishedYes

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