Impacts of subsidy policies on vaccination decisions in contact networks

To motivate more people to participate in vaccination campaigns, various subsidy policies are often supplied by government and the health sectors. However, these external incentives may also alter the vaccination decisions of the broader public, and hence the choice of incentive needs to be carefully considered. Since human behavior and the networking-constrained interactions among individuals significantly impact the evolution of an epidemic, here we consider the voluntary vaccination on human contact networks. To this end, two categories of typical subsidy policies are considered: (1) under the free subsidy policy, the total amount of subsidy is distributed to a certain fraction of individual and who are vaccinated without personal cost, and (2) under the partial-offset subsidy policy, each vaccinated person is offset by a certain amount of subsidy. A vaccination decision model based on evolutionary game theory is established to study the effects of these different subsidy policies on disease control. Simulations suggest that, because the partial-offset subsidy policy encourages more people to take vaccination, its performance is significantly better than that of the free subsidy policy. However, an interesting phenomenon emerges in the partial-offset scenario: with limited amount of total subsidy, a moderate subsidy rate for each vaccinated individual can guarantee the group-optimal vaccination, leading to the maximal social benefits, while such an optimal phenomenon is not evident for the free subsidy scenario. © 2013 American Physical Society.