TY - JOUR
T1 - Excluded Knowledge
AU - Lee, Christian
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.Does vagueness exclude knowledge? After arguing for an affirmative answer to this question, I consider a fascinating objection. Barnett (Philos Phenomenol Res 82:22–45, 2011) offers purported counterexamples to the following: Vagueness as to whether p entails that nobody knows whether p. These putative counterexamples, were they successful, would establish that standard accounts of vagueness are mistaken. I defend three central theses: First, whenever it is vague whether p (i) competent speakers would be ambivalent about whether p when considering whether p, and (ii) such ambivalence would exclude knowledge of whether p. Second, it is impossible for there to be vagueness regarding which of two polar opposite mental states obtains when only one of such states obtains. Finally, this type of impossibility constitutes evidence for dualism; i.e., the thesis that mental states are neither identical to physical states nor obtain in virtue of the obtaining of physical states.
AB - © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.Does vagueness exclude knowledge? After arguing for an affirmative answer to this question, I consider a fascinating objection. Barnett (Philos Phenomenol Res 82:22–45, 2011) offers purported counterexamples to the following: Vagueness as to whether p entails that nobody knows whether p. These putative counterexamples, were they successful, would establish that standard accounts of vagueness are mistaken. I defend three central theses: First, whenever it is vague whether p (i) competent speakers would be ambivalent about whether p when considering whether p, and (ii) such ambivalence would exclude knowledge of whether p. Second, it is impossible for there to be vagueness regarding which of two polar opposite mental states obtains when only one of such states obtains. Finally, this type of impossibility constitutes evidence for dualism; i.e., the thesis that mental states are neither identical to physical states nor obtain in virtue of the obtaining of physical states.
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-015-0858-2
DO - 10.1007/s11229-015-0858-2
M3 - Article
VL - 193
SP - 2427
EP - 2452
JO - Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science
JF - Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 8
ER -