Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri-environmental Schemes

A. Ozanne, Ben White

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    17 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187-202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329-347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353-360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329-347) is used. Incentive-compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes - in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection - confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)260-268
    JournalJournal of Agricultural Economics
    Volume58
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2007

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