Embodied cognition

Lucia Foglia, Robert A. Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

186 Citations (Scopus)


Traditional views in philosophy of mind and cognitive science depict the mind as an information processor, one whose connections with the body and the world are of little theoretical importance. On the contrary, mounting empirical evidence shows that bodily states and modality-specific systems for perception and action underlie information processing, and that embodiment contributes to various aspects and effects of mental phenomena. This article will briefly review and discuss some of this evidence and what it implies. By challenging mainstream accounts of mind and cognition, embodiment views offer new ways of conceptualizing knowledge and suggest novel perspectives on cognitive variation and mind-body reductionism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)319-325
Number of pages7
JournalWiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2013
Externally publishedYes


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