The thesis defends a form of scientific realism based on the use of instruments of detection and operations of measurement in scientific practice (and operations more generally construed). I argue that we can have knowledge of the detectable and measurable part of the world in virtue of what our instruments of detection and measurement indicate. Although related to Ian Hackings entity realism, the kind of realism I defend is substantially different. Unlike Hacking, I wish to argue for an important relationship between a theory and the entities over which that theory ranges. Thus, an important part of the project will be to justify those „secure parts of a theory used to interpret what is indicated by our instruments of detection and measurement. The thesis also considers what ontological commitments are required for this form of realism, and how these commitments relate to important developments in the realism debate within the philosophy of science.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Publication status||Unpublished - 2010|