Cascading Failure Model Considering Multi-Step Attack Strategy

Hengdao Guo, Herbert Ho Ching Iu, Tyrone Fernando, Ciyan Zheng, Xi Zhang, Chi K. Tse

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference paperConference paper

    Abstract

    Modeling and analysis of cascading failures draws wide attention recently due to frequent occurrences of large blackouts all over the world. Models based on complex network theory contribute significantly on analyzing the robustness of power systems and assessing the risk probability, while they fall short of producing the propagation of the cascading failure in exact time points. This paper presents an improved topological model taking timescale into consideration, as well as the relay setting which reveals its operation more accurately according to industrial standards. The paper then validates the model using UIUC 150-bus and IEEE 39-bus test system. In order to assess the vulnerability of a power network, the multi-step attack strategy has been provided. The results demonstrate that timescales and relay settings have a critical impact during the cascading failure and the proposed attack strategy may lead to larger blackouts than normal strategies.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2018 - Proceedings
    Place of PublicationUSA
    PublisherIEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
    Volume2018-May
    ISBN (Electronic)9781538648810
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 26 Apr 2018
    Event2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2018 - Firenze Fiera Congress and Exhibition Center, Florence, Italy
    Duration: 27 May 201830 May 2018

    Conference

    Conference2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2018
    CountryItaly
    CityFlorence
    Period27/05/1830/05/18

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Cascading Failure Model Considering Multi-Step Attack Strategy'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this