Abstract
This thesis examines Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom. Existing studies either focus on Berlin’s explanation of Rousseau’s moral thought or his reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom. This study combines these two aspects and therefore systematically explores the intellectual bases of Berlin’s account of Rousseau. Reader-response theory is applied as the methodology for understanding Berlin’s account.
The thesis concludes that Berlin overlooks some complex aspects of Rousseau’s notion of freedom for the sake of his own theoretical consistency; and that Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense ought to be understood not only as positive freedom, as Berlin portrays it, but also as negative freedom.
The thesis concludes that Berlin overlooks some complex aspects of Rousseau’s notion of freedom for the sake of his own theoretical consistency; and that Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense ought to be understood not only as positive freedom, as Berlin portrays it, but also as negative freedom.
Original language | English |
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Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
Publication status | Unpublished - 2014 |