Abstract
Any method for establishing genetic relatedness by identifying similar
constructions in different languages must provide a means of measuring similarity.
As long as the identification of regular sound correspondences is our measure of
similarity in linguistic form, there can be no avoiding appeal to sound
correspondences in genetic arguments. This is true even for the type of evidence
termed shared aberrancy. If early comparative historical linguists thought
otherwise, as is often suggested, then by modern standards their proofs are invalid.
I argue that many such claims regarding early 19th century comparativist practice
involve a distorted and selective view of the history of linguistics. I also argue that
claims regarding Meillet's supposed privileging of shared aberrancy over sound
correspondence in the early 20th century follow from a misinterpretation of his
notion fait particulier 'singular fact'.
constructions in different languages must provide a means of measuring similarity.
As long as the identification of regular sound correspondences is our measure of
similarity in linguistic form, there can be no avoiding appeal to sound
correspondences in genetic arguments. This is true even for the type of evidence
termed shared aberrancy. If early comparative historical linguists thought
otherwise, as is often suggested, then by modern standards their proofs are invalid.
I argue that many such claims regarding early 19th century comparativist practice
involve a distorted and selective view of the history of linguistics. I also argue that
claims regarding Meillet's supposed privileging of shared aberrancy over sound
correspondence in the early 20th century follow from a misinterpretation of his
notion fait particulier 'singular fact'.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 9-62 |
| Volume | III |
| Specialist publication | Romano Bohemica |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |