Abstract
This article examines the meaning of "truth'tin philosophyand in the law and it identifies notable dissonance betweenthe two discourses. Deep divisions run within philosophyon the meaning of the term, while an examination ofthe term in the context of the law also reveals tensions.There are long held views that the truth is subservient tojustice; and that proof rather than the truth is the justicesystem's main concern. That position, however, is notunanimous. A paradox that flows from this discussion isthat there are at least two, potentially conflicting, kinds oftruth in a trial- substantive truth andjormallegal truth.The ramifications are significant.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 53-83 |
| Journal | The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review |
| Volume | 11 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |