© 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Presentism faces a familiar objection from truthmaker theory. how can propositions about the past be made true if past entities do not exist? In answering this question, there are, broadly, two roads open to the presentist. the easy road to presentism proceeds by capitulating to the demands imposed by truthmaker theory and finding truthmakers for claims about the past. this road typically involves the invocation of controversial metaphysical posits that must then be defended. the hard road to presentism resists the demands of truthmaker theory by denying that all truths must be truth-made. the road is hard as it requires providing a principled restriction on the scope of truthmaker theory. In this paper. I argue that the hard road collapses back into the easy road; there is no hard road to presentism.
|Journal||American Philosophical Quarterly|
|Publication status||Published - 2015|