A bump on the road to presentism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Presentism faces a familiar objection from truthmaker theory. how can propositions about the past be made true if past entities do not exist? In answering this question, there are, broadly, two roads open to the presentist. the easy road to presentism proceeds by capitulating to the demands imposed by truthmaker theory and finding truthmakers for claims about the past. this road typically involves the invocation of controversial metaphysical posits that must then be defended. the hard road to presentism resists the demands of truthmaker theory by denying that all truths must be truth-made. the road is hard as it requires providing a principled restriction on the scope of truthmaker theory. In this paper. I argue that the hard road collapses back into the easy road; there is no hard road to presentism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)345-356
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume52
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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Roads
Truthmakers
Presentism
Entity
Metaphysical
Question Answering
Illinois
Presentist
Trustees

Cite this

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title = "A bump on the road to presentism",
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A bump on the road to presentism. / Baron, Samuel.

In: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2015, p. 345-356.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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N2 - © 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Presentism faces a familiar objection from truthmaker theory. how can propositions about the past be made true if past entities do not exist? In answering this question, there are, broadly, two roads open to the presentist. the easy road to presentism proceeds by capitulating to the demands imposed by truthmaker theory and finding truthmakers for claims about the past. this road typically involves the invocation of controversial metaphysical posits that must then be defended. the hard road to presentism resists the demands of truthmaker theory by denying that all truths must be truth-made. the road is hard as it requires providing a principled restriction on the scope of truthmaker theory. In this paper. I argue that the hard road collapses back into the easy road; there is no hard road to presentism.

AB - © 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Presentism faces a familiar objection from truthmaker theory. how can propositions about the past be made true if past entities do not exist? In answering this question, there are, broadly, two roads open to the presentist. the easy road to presentism proceeds by capitulating to the demands imposed by truthmaker theory and finding truthmakers for claims about the past. this road typically involves the invocation of controversial metaphysical posits that must then be defended. the hard road to presentism resists the demands of truthmaker theory by denying that all truths must be truth-made. the road is hard as it requires providing a principled restriction on the scope of truthmaker theory. In this paper. I argue that the hard road collapses back into the easy road; there is no hard road to presentism.

M3 - Article

VL - 52

SP - 345

EP - 356

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JF - American Philosophical Quarterly

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