张弛有别: 上级控制力、下级自主性和农村基层政令执行

本文通过分析多年的全国抽样数据发现，当今中国乡、村两级治理主体执行政令的情况取决于上级控制力和下级自主性之间的张力。在不同治理层级和工作领域之间，由于上述张力存在差异，政令执行情况也不尽相同。具体来说，农村税费改革在进一步强化县级党政机关对乡镇控制力的同时，却削弱了乡镇对村级治理机构的控制力。同时，虽然某些高层特别重视的政令能在相当程度上下达基层，但乡、村两级治理机构往往更倾向于主动重视那些与本位利益直接相关的工作，并常会有选择地忽视那些上级重视程度不高、不易考核和难以直接带来本位利益的工作。

Drawing upon representative national survey data collected in 2000, 2004, and 2007, this paper systematically examines how township and village authorities in contemporary rural China actually implement the policies and instructions that they receive from above. The empirical evidence reveals the following. First, the actual situation of policy implementation in contemporary rural China is often jointly determined by the controlling powers that upper-level authorities have over their subordinate agencies on the one hand, and the discretion enjoyed by the latter on the other. Second, the interactions between upper-level authorities and their subordinate agencies vary across different governmental levels and policy fields. County authorities are more capable in controlling over township authorities, but township authorities often have relatively weaker control over village authorities. Such a pattern was reinforced after the rural taxation reform in early 2000s. In addition, this paper also demonstrates that local authorities in contemporary rural China tend to prioritise activities which can bring about direct benefits to them, even when such activities are not regarded as priorities by their higher-ups.